The Surprising Effects of the Great Recession: Losers and Winners in Thailand in 2008-2009 Introduction
In late 2008, the world economy went into recession and world GDP fell by 0.6% in 2009 0.6% in (IMF 2012 . In an exercise that has been widely cited, Ravallion and Chen (2009) spending, and devote some effort to measuring the relevant elasticities. They argue that such an assessment "can produce findings and insights for swift policy actions" (p.1), although they recognize that the estimates only apply to "the aggregate impacts of the crisis, not the impacts at the household level" (p.2).
The main problem with such simulations is that they focus almost exclusively on a single variable, such as consumption, as the main driver of poverty. In reality, and especially in the short-run, other factors matter. For instance, a growth slowdown accompanied, perhaps even triggered, by higher energy prices -and perhaps the higher food prices that may ensue (Chongvilaivan 2012) -is likely to have very different distributional effects compared to one associated with lower energy prices. This makes it remarkably difficult to forecast the effects of recession on groups within a country, such as the poor, or rural households, or children. Yet it is groups such as these that policy interventions typically need to target.
The effects of a global recession on living standards are also likely to vary widely from country to country, given differences in economic structures, and sources of household income. For instance, de Janvry and Sadoulet (2010) found, somewhat to their surprise, that during the global food crisis of 2006-2008, when food prices rose sharply, most farm households in Guatemala lost from the rising prices. For Thailand -consistently the world's largest exporter of rice - Jitsuchon and Siamwalla (2009) found that the higher rice prices of 2007 helped some poor households and hurt others, with a net effect that was difficult to determine. Headey (2011) notes the striking contrast between simulations, which estimated that 75-160 million people would be "thrown into hunger and poverty" due to the global food crisis, and the results of selfreported outcomes that the number of "food-insecure" people fell by 60-250 million between 2005 and 2008. The important point here is that it is essential to build policy on actual data -to the extent practicable -rather than on simulations. This is in line with one of the main lessons that the World Bank (2009) draws from previous crises in which it emphasizes the need for "sound information on what is happening on the ground as the crisis unfolds" (p.8).
An implication of this discussion is that the effects of global recession on socio-demographic groups within a country are an empirical matter. For instance, Bresciani et al. (2002) , in their study of the impact of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 on farm households in Thailand and Indonesia, find that poor farmers were hard hit in Thailand, but not in Indonesia, and that in both countries farmers specializing in export crops benefitted from the currency devaluation associated with that crisis.
The volume edited by Khandker (2002) includes several papers that trace the effects of the East Asian financial crisis on poverty in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and China.
One generalization is that "the uneducated, inexperienced, young female workers, and the urban sector suffered most from the crisis" (p.5), but there were variations across countries. The ultrapoor suffered disproportionately in Malaysia, as did households headed by old, or very young, individuals; poverty rose rapidly in Indonesia, especially in Java, but also fell quickly when the crisis had passed; and large households suffered from the slowdown, due at least as much to El Niño as to the financial crisis, in the Philippines. Yap et al. (2009) provide an exhaustive recent update for the Philippines. Ananta and Barichello (2012) argue that in Southeast Asia, as a result off the 1997 crisis, "the poor have and will have suffered the most" (p.3). Boonyamanond and Punpuing (2012) , in the same volume, note that poverty rose in Thailand, especially in the Northeast, but with a lag, as households in that relatively poor region found their remittance receipts shrink and prospects for work in Bangkok diminish.
There have been relatively few published studies so far of the actual (as opposed to simulated) effects of the most recent global recession on groups within society. Aryeetey and Ackah (2011) argue that the crisis of 2008-2009 had a strong aggregate impact on the economies of Africa, and suggest that "there is growing evidence that the impact on the poor has been more acute than for the non-poor" (p.419). Huang et al. (2011) In the context of Thailand, Paitoonpong and Akkarakul (2009) argue that women "are among the most vulnerable to the downturn" (p.11), mainly due to their relatively high representation in the less-stable jobs in export-oriented manufacturing firms. Chirathivat and Mallikamas (2011) show that while food consumption was maintained during the crisis period, and spending on services rose, the amount devoted to buying durable goods fell sharply. They do not, however, disaggregate the effects to the level of household groups. The World Bank (2010, p.69) contends that in Thailand, "vulnerable households lost ground in 2009". Figure 1 shows that during the great recession economic growth in Thailand followed the same pattern as the world as a whole, with a 2.3% drop in real GDP in 2009, the worst contraction in Southeast Asia (Swee-Hock 2011, p.10).
The Question of Interest
In this paper we address a seemingly straightforward question: Who in Thailand was actually hurt by the recession of 2009? Was it the poor, or the ultra-poor, or urban populations, or farmers, or women, or wage workers, or large households, or the self-employed, or young children, or school children, or pensioners, or those in the informal sector? Only once we have answered this question can we begin to determine whether the government response to the recession was well targeted, and of an appropriate magnitude. This work also fits within the growing body of research on how households cope in times of recession; UNESC (2009) presents a recent example.
An important reason for focusing on Thailand is the availability of excellent and timely household survey data. The National Statistics Office conducts its Socio-Economic Survey on an on-going basis, interviewing about 3,800 households nationwide every month, and collecting detailed information on consumption as well as many other variables. In principle this allows one to track the actual effects of global recession on different groups in Thailand, with a lag (to allow for data cleaning and processing) of just a month or two. We are also interested in whether data of this nature are likely to be helpful when a government crafts its response to the cold winds of global recession.
We begin by examining in more detail the timing of the 2008-2009 recession as it affected Thailand, and documenting the effects on output and unemployment. After developing a serviceable measure of welfare, we then use data from the Thailand Socio-Economic Surveys to construct a month-by-month time series for consumption, which we deflate to obtain real per capita consumption levels. This allows us to trace the effects of the recession on different sociodemographic groups, both on average, and controlling for a wide variety of household-level variables.
Our main, and somewhat surprising, conclusion, for which we argue more carefully below, is that the only major socio-demographic group hurt by the 2009 recession was younger wageearners in the greater Bangkok region, who were hit by the sharp, if relatively short, drop in export-oriented manufacturing. On average, the poor in Thailand actually benefitted from the recession, because the effects of lower prices of food and energy outweighed the other influences on their economic wellbeing. We offer some further thoughts, including on the role of government in the crisis, and the importance of rooting policy in actual data, in the concluding section.
Timing the Recession
The annual data on GDP growth rates shown in Figure 1 indicate that economic growth in Thailand, and worldwide, slowed in 2008, and GDP fell in 2009 . From the standard macroeconomic identity, we have:
It is useful to decompose the growth of GDP into the contributions of each of these components, and this is shown in the bars in Figure 1 . Most of the drop in Thai GDP in 2009 was due to a sharp fall in investment spending, which then rebounded in the following year.
Real consumer spending rose in every year except 2009, when it dipped slightly (by 1.1%). The rise in net exports was the major contributor to GDP growth in 2006 and 2007; in 2009, although exports fell sharply (by 9.1%), imports fell even more (by 12.6%), so the current account played a strong role in moderating the drop in GDP.
Real government spending on goods and services rose by 0.9% in 2009, but Figure 1 shows that the contribution to economic growth was rather modest, despite the stimulus programs of 2009 and 2010. However, this understates the potential role of government in maintaining GDP, since it also transfers resources to households directly, thereby helping to maintain private consumption spending. The annual data that are summarized in Figure 1 are not fine-grained enough to allow us to date the onset of recession very accurately. Some further words of explanation are in order. The information on household consumption spending comes from the socio-economic surveys that are undertaken on a continuing basis by the National Statistics Office. About 3,800 different households are surveyed every month using stratified cluster sampling, for which the weights are known: the strata are the country's provinces, and clusters of households are surveyed in randomly-chosen villages or urban wards.
When aggregated to annual or even quarterly levels, the data are nationally representative, but are somewhat less so at the monthly level.
The socio-economic surveys do not collect price data, so in order to calculate real spending we had to match price data from the Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices (2012) with the survey data. More precisely, we matched the monthly price series for about 120 items of consumer spending, which are available for each of the five major regions of Thailand, with spending categories from the socio-economic surveys, region by region. This allowed us to construct real spending for each household. We did not deflate the value of goods produced by the household for its own consumption: a higher price for such goods would work on both the income and expenditure sides of the ledger, with no net effect on wellbeing (assuming no behavioral response to price changes). 
Winners and Losers
We are now in a position to address the central question of this paper, which is to measure the extent to which groups in Thai society saw changes in their wellbeing during the [2008] [2009] recession. We start with some graphs, and then offer a more formal treatment of the subject. The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows the evolution of real per capita expenditure for a selection of deciles, with very little apparent variation over time in the bottom decile (decile 1) or the fifth decile, and some variation but no apparent trend in the top decile. The SES data for [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] are combined; the measures we used are based on a consistent set of survey questions and protocols that did not change over the period in question. Households are grouped into deciles based on the combined data, so that the deciles represent consistent levels of per capita expenditure over time. Our interest is in the coefficients related to the dummy variables for the various quarters; more specifically, we would like to know whether there was a significant change in expenditure per capita between 2007 and 2008, 2008 and 2009, and 2009 and 2010 . The results based on the estimates in Table 1 are summarized in Table 2 The main explanation is relatively straightforward: prices fell sharply during the recession, which boosted purchasing power, while households were able to smooth their consumption relative to their incomes; we discuss these effects more fully below. Small households saw a significant rise in expenditure levels in 2010, but most of the other changes do not show up as statistically significant when the data are disaggregated by household size. Households that were net sellers of crops did not see any particularly low expenditure in The numbers in Table 4 show the effects of the recession by gender, and by age. Each regression is weighted by the number of males, or children aged under 5, or other age category, in the household. This should thus measure the experience of these groupings of individuals during 2007-2010. So, for example, in looking at the effect on women, a household with no women would have no weight in the regression -i.e. the observation would be excluded -and a household with two women would have double weight, and so on. The maintained hypothesis, in the absence of other information, is that the consumption per capita for each household member reflects the average consumption per capita for a household. The first point to note is that there are no strong differences in the experience of men and boys The remaining results are set out in Table 5 , and mainly examine whether some groups, traditionally considered to be vulnerable, were hurt by the recession. The answer is by and large no. Widows, and those who had separated from their spouses, were not differentially affected.
The ill and disabled did not become worse off.
The average income of households with children at school is relatively low, but this group was, if anything, better off during 2009. For those aged 15-19 who were at school ( 
Robustness
Our focus is on a monetary measure of wellbeing in the form of real consumption per capita.
Could Thai households be maintaining their consumption levels by reducing investment -for instance, by pulling children out of school so they can work, or by delaying purchases of assets such as cars? Figure 8 shows age-specific school enrollment rates for 2007-2010, based on data from the socio-economic surveys. The pre-school rate refers to children 5 and younger, and subsequent age groups are associated with the relevant school level: 6-11 for primary education, 12-14 for lower secondary school, 15-17 for upper secondary school, and 18-22 for higher education.
There was no perceptible drop in enrollment rates during the 2008-2009 recession -the period shown by the shaded areas in Figure 8 . The results of a more formal test are shown in Table 6 : we regress the age-specific enrollment rates on binary variables representing each quarter, and test whether there is a difference from one year to the next. We are able to separate private from public schools. The only measurable effects are the significant uptick in public lower-secondary education, and a fall in uppersecondary education, between 2009 and 2010. In no case is there a significant change in enrollment rates between 2007, 2008, and 2009 . We conclude that the recession did not have a measurable effect on the level of enrollments. A common household response to a drop in income is to cut purchases of durable goods sharply in order to be able to maintain consumption of non-durables, including food. The results in Table 7 are designed to determine whether this is what occurred in 2009. We use the same approach as employed earlier, testing whether there are differences in the time fixed effects between one year and the next, for major spending headings.
In no case was there a significant fall in spending on durable goods between 2008 and 2009, and in some cases there were increases, such as for purchases of automobiles/vans/pickups. This is confirmed by the data in the bottom panel of Table 7, should be noted that the bulk of the harvest arrives in November and is consumed the following year. We surmise that consumption smoothing, to the extent that it occurred, did not occur at the expense of investment in durable goods or schooling, but more probably through lower saving. 
Are Survey Data Essential?
Thailand is unusual in the quality and frequency with which it collects household survey data.
Could one have determined the effects of the 2008 recession in a cheaper way, for instance using readily-available monthly data on such series as international trade, production, or agricultural output? This would make it easier for other countries to build models -based on occasionallyavailable household survey data -that could then be used, along with easy-to-find data series, to track the effects of external shocks on major groups in society, such as the poor, or women, or older individuals. We note, however, that past efforts to derive welfare effects from a small number of readily-available, or easily-collectable, variables have not been successful (Ravallion 1996; Haughton and Khandker 2009 ). Certainly, the strong seasonal rhythm of agricultural production (see Figure 9 ) makes it difficult to use monthly agricultural data to help track the patterns of household consumption. The approach we take here is to regress real consumption per capita (for each household), from the socio-economic survey data for 2007 through 2010, on a variety of household level variables (the "survey regression" variables listed in Table 8 ) and on a number of data series that are published monthly and are readily available ("public data regression" variables in Table 8 ). If there is a close fit between the public data and per capita income, then the equation would be viable for forecasting purposes. However, the final column of Table 8 shows that such equations never fit well, with values of adjusted R 2 always below 0.15. The fit is substantially better when one uses the survey regression variables (first column of numbers in Table 8 ), but these are not available in the absence of survey data. When the public data are added to the survey regression variables the improvement in fit is always very small.
One could look more systematically for potential predictors of real per capita income for major groups, but our basic explorations are not promising. There do not appear to be cheaper or easier ways to determine reliably the effect of shocks on households, and so there is a continued need for regular surveys of household living standards. Variables included: Survey regression: As in Table 1 : size of household; household runs a business; most income from wages; most income from profits; no. of males; no. aged under 5, 5-9, 10-14, 15-19, 20-29, 30-59, 60-64, 65-74, 75 and over; head is a widow; head is separated; no. with just primary education, just secondary education, just upper vocational education, university education, post-graduate education. Public data regression: Dummies for region (N, C, NE, S, Bangkok is reference), and for urban residence; monthly series on: unemployment rate; consumer price index for south, northeast, north, center, Bangkok; U.S. dollar value of exports of agricultural products, manufacturing, overall; index of baht value of export price, export volume, import price, import volume; terms of trade; business sentiment index; expected business sentiment index; leading economic index; no. of foreign tourists; inverse of price of oil; monthly wage in private sector; monthly wage in government sector; price of 5% broken rice (in baht); price of tapioca flour (in baht); price of tin concentrate (in baht). Somewhat to our surprise, we find that the recession itself was not associated with a reduction in real spending for most groups in Thai society. Neither women, nor the poor, nor rural residents, nor children, were particularly hurt by the recession. The main exception is that young adults, especially those residing in Bangkok, and with a vocational education, were negatively affected in
2009. This is consistent with the observation that export-led manufacturing, which is concentrated around Bangkok, contracted sharply for several months.
There are a number of possible explanations for the benign, and for some people, even Constrained by the data, our focus is on real expenditure, not income. But there is clear evidence that Thai households smooth consumption, and so spending is less volatile than income (Susantud 2012; Khandker, Koolwal, Haughton, and Jitsuchon 2012 ). Consumption smoothing was also possible in 2009 because most Thai households had experienced an extended period of low unemployment and robust wages, so they had assets they could dip into;
this might have been harder had the recession lasted longer.
We also examined the possibility that Thai households maintained their consumption by reducing investments in schooling and in durable goods. The evidence points very clearly to the conclusion that school enrollment rates were maintained throughout the recession; and purchases of durables, which fell in 2008, actually rebounded somewhat in 2009.
The third explanation for the modest impact of the recession is that government intervention may have been effective. In 2008, the government lowered taxes (to the tune of 40 billion baht), extended more loans (an additional 400 billion baht), cut some energy prices (and taxes), and introduced free travel on some bus lines (at a cost of 50 billion baht). Then, in 2009, it introduced a first stimulus package, which extended the earlier policies, and introduced a supplementary budget worth 117 billion baht: checks for 2,000 baht were send to many lowincome households, allowances of 500 baht were sent to pensioners, and public education was made free through age 15. Half of the appropriated money had been disbursed by May 2009, and the effect is believed to have been slightly pro-poor. A second stimulus package was introduced later in 2009, and promised 1.43 trillion worth of public investment (through 2012), some price guarantees for rice, and expanded credit guarantees. Jitsuchon (2010, p.28) has expressed the concern that the stimulus packages represented "an excuse to rush spending", and this is indeed possible. It is not the purpose of this paper to try to tease out the relative contributions of government, and other factors, both to the recession and the recovery; this is an important issue, but necessarily the subject of a separate paper. In any event, the Thai economy rebounded rapidly, as exports surged and tourist numbers recovered quickly, and in 2010 exceeded previous records.
While this paper has focused on the case of Thailand, there are some themes that are more broadly relevant. A simple simulation exercise based on the slowdown of consumption or GDP growth would have been incomplete; by ignoring the changes in relative prices that occurred at the same time, and perhaps other effects that are not easily observed, it would not have correctly identified the losers and winners. In order to identify who is really being hurt, it is important to have actual data. Thailand is a leader in this respect with good-quality monthly household-level data that can help the government target its response more effectively. It would be nice if one could simulate the effects of economic shocks on different social groups using readily-available data series, but our experiments in this suggest that such an approach is not realistic.
Economic structure matters, and that is the second lesson. The effects of the great recession on
Thailand reflect the country's dependence on export-oriented manufacturing, rice cultivation, and tourism. These effects are likely to be quite different from those experienced elsewhere, even in neighboring countries such as Myanmar or Malaysia. This makes it difficult to generalize productively about the effects of recession and the appropriate policies needed to soften the social impact. Country-specific policy analysis, rooted in timely local evidence, remains essential.
